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1. Introduction. In a modern Dutch sentence like (1), the verb beloofde ‘prom-
ised’ does not describe an occurrence of the speech act of promising as it does in 
(2). Rather, in (1) it expresses a subjective judgment on the part of the speaker 
of the sentence, and the use of the verb may therefore be called “epistemic”: The 
speaker is indicating that there is evidence for a certain expectation (here: that 
the debate will be exciting), and evaluating this positively. 
(1) Het  debat  beloofde  spannend te worden. 
 The debate promised  exciting  to become 
 ‘The debate promised to be exciting.’ 
(2) Hij  beloofde  de  grondwet te verdedigen. 
  He promised the basic-law  to defend 
 ‘He promised to defend the constitution.’ 
The notion of subjectivity thus plays an important part in characterizing the dif-
ference between the usage types exemplified in (1) and (2). In Verhagen (1995), 
I gave an analysis of the synchronic variation in these terms, focusing on the 
close relationships between semantic, syntactic, and discourse-pragmatic as-
pects. Specifically, I argued that the difference did not so much consist in fea-
tures of subjectivity being added to the meaning of the verb, but rather in the 
loss of objective (descriptive) content. I also showed that a similar analysis was 
possible for two other verbs, viz. dreigen ‘threaten’ and weigeren ‘refuse’, in 
such cases as Het debat dreigde uit de hand te lopen ‘The debate threatened to 
get out of hand’ and De motor weigerde te starten ‘The engine refused to start’. 
In this paper I wish to start an investigation of the historical development of 
these uses. I will only be concerned with the semantics here, and the material to 
be considered so far only stems from dictionaries (in particular the WNT). Nev-
ertheless, it will become apparent that some interesting hypotheses can already 
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be formulated, partly in line with the analysis of subjectification in Verhagen 
(1995), and suggesting particular extensions at certain points. 
I will begin by discussing a specific approach to the concept of subjectivity, 
essentially following Verhagen (1995) but made more explicit in a few respects, 
making a distinction between “character subjectivity” and “speaker-hearer sub-
jectivity” (see also Verhagen 1997). Subsequently I will show that the historical 
material in the WNT indicates a difference in the development of beloven on the 
one hand and dreigen on the other which does not seem to follow from the 
analysis, nor from a metaphorical conception of the relation between descriptive 
and epistemic uses of linguistic elements. However, precisely the notion of sub-
jectivity as developed here may provide the basis for an explanation, given an 
independently established difference between the words as speech act verbs. 
Finally, I will outline the role that metaphor might have played in the actual 
mechanism of the change, and some consequences of the analysis. 
 
2. Two types of subjectivity. A fundamental prerequisite for human linguistic 
communication is the ability to recognize other entities as essentially like one-
self, and to take another person’s perspective as one that could be one’s own. 
Without that, the whole idea of intentionally producing utterances to be recog-
nized as such and to be thereby understood would not make sense. It is therefore 
no surprise that languages contain several means to mark subjectivity, i.e. to 
indicate that the information being conveyed is seen from a certain perspective. I 
want to claim that there is actually an important distinction between two KINDS of 
subjectivity. One is subjectivity as indicated in linguistic utterances, the other is 
subjectivity as a feature of language-in-use, whether marked or not. The two are 
related, but not identical. 
Upon being confronted with certain sounds, marks on paper, or whatever 
other observable signs—when we interpret them as LANGUAGE, we are committed 
to understanding them as artifacts, i.e. the product of intentional activity, and 
therefore of another mind, another cognitive system. Furthermore, the assumed 
intentionality is that the producer wanted the observable artifact to be taken as 
evidence for a particular interpretation, i.e. intended it as a means to influence 
another cognitive system.1 As a matter of principle, any instance of language 
use, qua language use, has a certain argumentational force and direction, orient-
ing an interpreter, with more or less force, towards certain conclusions (Ans-
combre & Ducrot 1989). 
Understanding a linguistic utterance does not necessarily have to take the 
fact of its having been produced with a certain argumentational orientation into 
account. One may just process the utterance on the basis of one’s knowledge of 
the rules of the language, and simply “get the message,” as it were. But that does 
not alter the fact that understanding still IS engaging in coordination with another 
cognitive system, and because of this being inherent in linguistic communica-
                                                          
1
 What I mean here is an implication of Grice’s (1957) notion “meaningNN”. It occurs in 
slightly varying forms in different frameworks. A clear exposition can be found inter alia 
in Keller’s (1995: 153ff.; 1998) discussion of linguistic communication as an attempt to 
influence somebody else’s cognition by displaying the intention to do so. 
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tion, it MAY always become more important. With respect to language as it is 
being used it is always LEGITIMATE, so to speak, to ask in what way the conceived 
producer might have intended to influence a conceived addressee (even if one 
has no idea about the identity of the actual producers or addressees, they have 
already long been dead, or whatever). So in principle there is a systematic option 
when a language user is trying to figure out how to take a particular feature of an 
utterance: Even if it is not related to the level of intersubjective coordination by 
convention, this level may always be MADE relevant in interpreting the utterance. 
The ability to conceive of other minds as like oneself is such a fundamental 
aspect of communication that it should come as no surprise that there are nu-
merous linguistic means of marking explicitly that certain pieces of information 
are attributable to other minds in some specific way. A very important class of 
such items are complement-taking verbs. Verbs of communication (say, tell, 
argue, promise), of mental states and activities (think, know, conclude), etc., are 
explications that the interpreter should relate the information in the embedded 
clause in a particular way to the conception of another cognitive system—they 
are all mental space-builders (Fauconnier 1994). Understanding such a construc-
tion means that the interpreter knows s/he should “think the thought” expressed 
in the embedded clause in the same way as the subject of conceptualization indi-
cated in the matrix clause (cf. Verhagen 1997). For example, the matrix clauses 
in both (3) and (4) indicate a subject of conceptualization, in this case as under-
taking a promise. 
(3) I promise to come to the party. 
(4) He promised to come to the party. 
In (3), there appear to be only two levels of interpretation that are relevant 
to understanding, viz. firstly that of the information in the embedded (infinitival) 
clause, and secondly that of a subject in the matrix clause, who is the producer 
of the entire utterance. In the same way, the matrix clause in (4) also presents a 
subject of conceptualization, who determines the way the embedded information 
is to be taken by the interpreter (again, as something being promised). However, 
in this case there is an additional option. A hearer or reader may have reason to 
take into account that the report of someone promising is intentionally being 
presented to him/her by the producer of the utterance, who is not identical to the 
referent of the subject he.2 The interpreter could thus build into his interpreta-
tion what the conclusions are that the producer—as distinct from the explicit 
subject of conceptualization—is orienting him or her to with the utterance. This 
is the second type of subjectivity that I mentioned above. The fact that this type 
is always AVAILABLE for interpretation, even if it is not necessarily invoked con-
ventionally, gives rise to certain systematic patterns of variation and change. 
                                                          
2
 And it is actually slightly more complicated than this, as the first person pronoun does 
not always have to refer to the physical producer of the utterance (e.g. in a quotation, or 
in an advertisement line such as “Can I achieve this too?”, where the intended referent of 
I is the reader). It must, however, always be taken as indicating the entity PROJECTED as 
responsible for the production of the utterance. 
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For a start, consider example (4) once more. Understanding this minimally 
means to entertain the thought that some person presented the idea of coming to 
the party as a promise. But in addition to that we may ask: What might be, in an 
actual instance of use, the argumentational intention of the producer of the utter-
ance, as distinct from the promisor? In fact, there is a systematic relationship to 
this second level of subjectivity as well. In principle, the two levels are, in a 
sense, aligned. By reporting that someone promised to come, the producer is 
supplying an argument IN FAVOR OF the conclusion that this person will actually 
come. For example, consider the exchange in (5). 
(5) a. A: Is Peter coming to the party? 
  B: Sure, he promised. 
If A has asked whether Peter is coming to the party, B’s utterance that he prom-
ised counts as an argument, at that point in the discourse, in favor of the conclu-
sion that Peter will in fact come. It is not as STRONG, it does not have the same 
FORCE, as uttering ‘I promise’, but it still has the same argumentative direction. It 
is in that sense that the two types of subjectivity are aligned: Both a promisor 
and a reporter of a promise orient their hearers towards the conclusion that the 
contents of the complement may be expected to become true. The difference is 
one of strength, while the directions of orientation are the same. 
This can also be seen from the use of certain connectives. The connective 
so, for example, indicates that the second segment in a discourse fragment can 
be taken as following naturally from the contents of the first. Interestingly, it 
combines coherently with a reported promise as a first segment and an explicit 
expression of expectation in the second, as in (5b). 
(5) b. He promised to come, so he could be here any minute. 
On the other hand, the conjunction but indicates that the orientation of the sec-
ond conjunct is opposed to that of the first. Now consider (5c): 
(5) c. He promised to come, but I’m not entirely confident. 
The fact that but combines coherently with an expression of doubt in the second 
segment of (5c) precisely indicates that the first segment as such has the force of 
an argument in favor of the conclusion “He will come to the party.” But as men-
tioned before, its force is not maximal; as (5c) itself demonstrates, the relevant 
conclusion is cancelable in subsequent discourse. 
We are thus in a position to claim that any instance of the use of promise 
can be related to the level of intersubjective coordination between producer and 
interpreter in the way indicated schematically in figure 1: 
Argumentational 
orientation of  
• increases strength of assumption / expectation (cf. 
Anscombre & Ducrot 1989; Spooren 1989) 
promise: • evaluative orientation positive: “Don’t worry”, 
“Take it easy” 
Figure 1. Argumentational orientation of promise. 
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As indicated in figure 1, there is an evaluative dimension to promise as well: the 
addressee should entertain the idea of not having to worry, that things will be all 
right, or something else of that kind: the propositional content of promising is 
evaluated positively. 
This discussion provides the framework for understanding certain patterns 
of variation in the use of the verb promise and especially its Dutch equivalent 
beloven. Consider the difference between (1) and (2), repeated here: 
(1) Het debat beloofde spannend te worden. 
 The debate promised exciting to become 
 ‘The debate promised to be exciting.’ 
(2) Hij beloofde de grondwet te verdedigen. 
 He promised the base-law to defend 
 ‘He promised to defend the constitution.’ 
As observed, (2) reports an actual act of promising by whomever hij refers to, 
while the epistemic use of beloofde in (1) indicates a subjective judgment that 
there is evidence for the expectation that the debate will be exciting. What the 
two uses have in common, however, is that both orient the hearer towards the 
conclusion expressed in the complement, and evaluate it positively. So while 
these two uses of beloven are different with respect to what we may call charac-
ter subjectivity, they are in fact similar at the level of speaker-hearer subjectiv-
ity, and this, apparently, justifies the use of the same word. We might say that in 
cases like (1), the interpretation of beloven “skips” the level of another subject 
of conceptualization and is related immediately to the level of coordination with 
the producer of the utterance. 
Another example of this subjectified use of beloven is given in (6), as well 
as English promise in (7). 
(6) Het belooft een mooie dag te worden. 
 It promises a fine day to become 
 ‘It promises to be a fine day.’ 
(7) Tomorrow promises to be a fine day. 
Other verbs, semantically related to beloven and promise, exhibit similar pat-
terns, specifically dreigen and its English counterpart threaten. This verb can be 
used to report an act of threatening, as in (8). 
(8) De rector dreigde het onderwijs voor onbepaalde tijd te zullen staken. 
 The headmaster threatened the teaching for indefinite time to shall suspend 
 ‘The headmaster threatened to suspend teaching indefinitely.’ 
But this verb also has an epistemic use, as in (9), where it indicates an evalua-
tion again, by the producer of the utterance, not an act by the referent of the 
subject incident: 
(9) Het incident dreigde zijn kansen teniet te doen. 
 The incident threatened his chances to-nil to do 
 ‘The incident threatened to ruin his chances.’ 
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What these uses have in common and in what ways they differ can be de-
scribed in the same terms as those applicable to beloven/promise. Dreigen and 
threaten orient the interpreter towards the conclusion that the proposition ex-
pressed in the complement may become true, just like beloven and promise do, 
but this time this conclusion is evaluated negatively, suggesting that something 
should be done about it; the latter is what makes these verbs different from be-
loven and promise. These aspects of the argumentational orientation of dreigen 
can be illustrated with connectives in the same way as before with beloven. Con-
sider the exchange in (10a): 
(10) a. A: Are they really going to freeze the budget? 
  B: Well, they did threaten to do so. 
The coherence of this exchange, with B’s reply being interpreted as a positive 
answer to A’s question, indicates that threaten does indeed have this argumen-
tational orientation. Similarly, the fact that so is coherent in (10b) demonstrates 
that the first segment does indeed have the force of an argument in favor of the 
conclusion that he will come, and that this is viewed negatively: 
(10) b. He threatened to come, so be prepared: he could appear any minute. 
In (10c), finally, the fact that the reassuring second segment is contrasted with 
the first one precisely indicates that the latter as such has the force of a nega-
tively viewed prediction: 
(10) c. He threatened to fire us, but things might not be as black as they look. 
The difference between the descriptive and the epistemic senses is, just as with 
beloven, that in the latter case, the interpretation “skips” the level of another 
subject of conceptualization and relates immediately to the level of speaker-
hearer subjectivity. Schematically: 
Argumentational • increases strength of assumption/expectation 
orientation of 
threaten: 
• evaluative orientation negative: “Be prepared”, 
“Do something” 
Figure 2. Argumentational orientation of threaten. 
 
3. Asymmetric developments. The analysis presented so far (based on Ver-
hagen 1995) contains a synchronic generalization over the pragmatic function of 
descriptive and epistemic senses of beloven and dreigen. Putting it in diachronic 
terms now, what appears to have happened is that the argumentational orienta-
tion, originally an inferential aspect of interpretation of these verbs in actual 
usage, has been generalized and conventionalized, so that the verbs may now 
also be used systematically as indicators of such an argumentational orientation 
without referring to speech acts—thus a typical case of grammaticalization and 
specifically subjectification (cf. Traugott 1995). The nature of the explanation is 
such that exactly the same mechanism is used in the analysis of both verbs and 
one would therefore expect a largely parallel behavior of the verbs, synchroni-
cally as well as diachronically. However, there appear to be some important dif-
ferences here. 
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The first point is that it is clear, even impressionistically, that in actual dis-
course in Dutch the relative frequency of epistemic dreigen is much higher than 
that of epistemic beloven. Of the 21 cases of dreigen with an infinitival com-
plement in the Eindhoven Corpus,3 no less than 19 (over 90%) are in fact in-
stances of epistemic use, while of the 21 cases of beloven with an infinitive, only 
7 instances (33%) are epistemic.4 Searches in other corpora, such as de 
Volkskrant on CD-ROM, give very similar results. The logic of the analysis so 
far gives no reason to expect such a big difference. 
More interestingly, the epistemic use of beloven appears to be much 
younger than that of dreigen. The WNT gives a description of the epistemic 
sense of dreigen, and it gives examples from the sixteenth century on, as in 
(11) Het schip, twelck dreycht te sincken … (1566) 
 The ship, which threatens to sink 
 ‘The ship, which threatens to sink …’ 
But the WNT does not describe this kind of use for beloven. However, as of a 
few years ago, there is a CD-ROM version of the WNT, which allows us to 
search the quotations used throughout the work independently. Investigation of 
this material shows that it does contain instances of epistemic beloven, but al-
most all of these are from the nineteenth and twentieth century. The oldest ex-
ample is from 1793: 
(12) Dat zelfde meisjen, ’t welk iets beloofde te worden … 
 That same girl which something promised to become 
 ‘That same girl, who promised to become something …’ 
One might perhaps argue that this could in itself be ambiguous between a de-
scriptive and an epistemic reading, but the context, as cited in (12’), makes it 
unequivocally clear that the intended reading is epistemic. 
(12’) Dat zelfde meisjen,’t welk ... iets beloofde te worden, onder het bestuur 
eener vrouw wier groot talent lag in het opvoeden van jonge lieden, is 
verkwanseld: waarin? in eene lastige beuzelaarster, waar van het te 
vreezen is dat niets deegelijks meer zal te maaken zijn. [WNT: Wolff 
en Deken, Wildsch. 2, 119, 1793] 
 ‘That same girl, who promised to become something, under the guid-
ance of a woman whose great talent it was to raise young people, has 
been wasted: into what? into an irritating trifler, of which it must be 
feared that nothing solid can be made from it.’ 
It seems we have to conclude that the epistemic use of beloven arose (much) 
later in Dutch than the same kind of use of dreigen. This might in fact also help 
to explain why it is not mentioned in the WNT entry for beloven. This work was 
produced in the 1880s, so if epistemic beloven was a relatively new develop-
                                                          
3
 In the version of the corpus available from the Free University at Amsterdam. It is de-
scribed in Uit den Boogaart (1975) and in Renkema (1981). 
4
 The fact that the number of instances of this construction (verb + infinitive) is exactly 
the same (21) for both verbs is accidental. 
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ment there will have been only few examples in the material of those days, and 
it might not have been explicitly noticed by anyone else either. 
So let us assume, at least as a working hypothesis on the basis of this mate-
rial, that epistemic beloven is significantly younger than epistemic dreigen. How 
could this asymmetry be explained? I want to argue that the distinction between 
character subjectivity and speaker-hearer subjectivity is crucial once again. Con-
sider the following question: To whom may we attribute “responsibility,” so to 
speak, for the choice of the words beloven and dreigen on a particular occasion 
of use? The answers are different for reported promises and reported threats. 
Consider a reported promise such as (13): 
(13) He promised to come home early. 
Here the producer MAY be taken to report someone else as having said “I promise 
to come home early.” Under that interpretation, it is in fact the reported subject 
who is taken to be responsible for the choice of the word promise, and the pre-
sent speaker does little more than repeat what the original promisor said (with 
the appropriate shifts in pronominal reference and tense). But such an interpre-
tation is not possible for a reported threat, such as the one in (14): 
(14) He threatened to come home early. 
The producer of this sentence cannot be taken to be reporting the person referred 
to as having said “I threaten to come home early”—one cannot use threaten per-
formatively (Searle 1976: 6).5 And since one does not use threaten performa-
tively, the use of that word is always, of necessity, the responsibility of the ac-
tual producer of the present utterance, i.e. of the reporting rather than the re-
ported actor. Categorizing an event as a threat is definitely the responsibility of 
the producer, whereas categorizing it as a promise may be taken as simply 
echoing the subject of the promise. So the interpretation of threaten is related 
more systematically and more strongly to the level of the producer than that of 
promise. In diachronic terms, it must have been more speaker-hearer subjective 
“from the start.” 
At this point, it should be noted that a purely metaphorical account of the 
change in Dutch cannot be correct, or at least not complete. The idea of under-
standing the epistemic domain, the domain of reasoning and inferring, in terms 
of real-world relationships (cf. Sweetser 1990) does not in itself provide grounds 
for distinguishing between these two verbs. It does not seem to follow from this 
metaphor that a particular instance (the one that is evaluated negatively) of a 
real-world relation could be transferred more easily and sooner than another one 
(the positive one), while the notion of speaker-hearer subjectivity as a necessary 
property of language-in-use does provide such grounds. 
This does not mean that figurative language, metaphor and metonymy, have 
no role to play in the explanation of the change. In fact, I believe the contrary is 
true. But the metaphors that play a causal role in the change are not mappings 
from the real-world domain to the domain of reasoning, but rather more ordinary 
                                                          
5
 The reason is, I think, that it is self-defeating to simultaneously evaluate an activity 
negatively and commit oneself to it (cf. Verhagen 1995: 121). 
 ARIE VERHAGEN 205 
 
 
ones like personification. There is a type of subjectified use of beloven, not with 
an infinitival complement but with a nominal direct object, that does occur in the 
older WNT material. In the sixteenth-century sentence in (15), for example, Love 
is, we may say, personified and then presented as promising a cask of wine 
(metonymically related to a lot of pleasure, presumably), but giving only little: 
(15) Daar sy (de Min) belooft een tonne wijns, en geeft sy geen pinte ... 
[WNT: Coornhert 1, 274 d, 1586] 
“There she (Love) promises a cask of wine, and gives not even a pint ...” 
The point is that such a metaphorical subject also has a specific effect on the 
interpretation of the verb applied to that subject; for promise in (15) this effect is 
that the commissive aspect in its meaning becomes less relevant, and the predic-
tive aspect relatively more relevant. Love may be presented in certain relevant 
respects as a person, but since it does not have to be thought of as acting as in-
tentionally as a real human being, the idea of Love committing itself to some 
action is toned down, and the aspect of the presence of evidence for some ex-
pectation becomes at least relatively more important. 
Sentence (16) is another example of this type: while a beautiful body is 
definitely being personified, it does not make much sense to interpret belooft 
primarily as a description of a body committing itself to something. Rather, the 
fact that it provides evidence for a particular expectation is what is being con-
veyed here: 
(16) Een schoon lichaem belooft wel een schoone Ziele; maer het aenghe- 
zicht belieght oock wel het herte. [WNT: de Brune, Bank. 1, 14, 1657] 
‘A beautiful body surely promises a beautiful Soul;  but the face may 
well deceive the heart.’ 
A possible case of metonymy is (17): 
(17) In de punten des verdings met Atrecht, houd jk het 7e ’t vorderlijkste 
voor den Franchojs, om dat het belooft geene schattingen te heffen, dan 
by inwillighing der Staeten … [WNT: Hooft, Br. 3, 365, 1640]. 
‘Of the points in the treaty of Atrecht I hold the seventh for the one most 
profitable to the French, because it promises not to impose taxes but with 
the permission of the States …’ 
With a text (here: a treaty) standing for the writer(s), the adverbial clause intro-
duced by om dat ‘because’ in this context emphasizes the treaty’s nature as a 
source of profit for the French rather than the commitment on the part of the 
writers. Note in this regard that the treaty is a text produced by the TWO parties, 
including the French; therefore, it is strictly speaking not even the case that ref-
erence to the text only replaces reference to its writers, since in reality it is only 
the Dutch who are committed to abstain from imposing taxes. Therefore, an al-
ternative way of analyzing (17) is to say that the text is personified, in which 
case this example is of the same type as the previous two. 
What could very well have happened, judging from the evidence considered 
so far, is that towards the end of the eighteenth century the suggestion of a 
metaphorical commissive speech act was diminished to such an extent that it 
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became possible for the verb to be used as an epistemic modal with an infinitival 
complement, viz. when it was taken, in sentences of the type just mentioned, as 
no more than an indication of the presence of evidence for certain inferences.6 
One piece of evidence that this might have been at least part of the mecha-
nism of change is that in the case of dreigen such metaphorical uses seem to 
have preceded the use as a modal with an infinitival complement as well. The 
Middle Dutch Dictionary (MNW; Verdam & Verwijs 1885–1952) does mention 
metaphorical uses of the type described for beloven above, but not epistemic 
uses with infinitival complements, while the latter, as we have seen, have been 
in the language from the sixteenth century to the present. 
Finally, this order of development would provide a parallel to the order that 
Traugott (1993, 1997) argues for in the case of the English verbs promise and 
threaten. However, there also seems to be a striking difference between Dutch 
and English. According to Traugott, the epistemic senses of BOTH promise and 
threaten in English developed in the eighteenth century. Strictly speaking, the 
prediction from my analysis is that subjectification of promise cannot precede 
that of threaten, and thus the development in English is not a counterexample. 
However, it would be more natural, if the analysis is correct, for subjectification 
of threaten to have taken place significantly earlier than that of promise. So 
minimally, further research is necessary, using data from corpora and not just 
from the dictionaries. 
 
4. Conclusion. In this paper I have put forward a specific hypothesis about 
asymmetric diachronic subjectification and the mechanisms involved in it. This 
hypothesis is interesting and therefore worthy of further investigation for a 
number of theoretical consequences that follow from it. For one thing, if correct 
it would provide further confirmation for the argument in Verhagen (1995) that 
the process of subjectification essentially involves disappearance of descriptive 
aspects of meaning rather than the addition of epistemic, subjective features. 
Secondly, this kind of development would imply that what are syntactic 
variants at present have not been so all the time. As described in Verhagen 
(1995:109–10, 121ff.) and the ANS (Haeseryn et al. 1997:1042–3), epistemic 
beloven in subordinate clauses may only occur within a verbal cluster (“V-
raising”), whereas the descriptive use may be realized as a syntactic main verb 
taking an infinitival complement (“Extraposition”), as well as in a verbal cluster 
(Extraposition, according to the ANS, being the most usual option).7 Thus we 
have the asymmetry that with epistemic beloven only the order of (18b) is ac-
ceptable, while with the descriptive sense, both orders (19a, b) are: 
                                                          
6
 One might hypothesize, in view of considerations like these, that there is a scale rang-
ing from commissiveness to predictiveness, of which descriptive and epistemic uses are 
actually just endpoints. In fact, such a scale can even be observed in present-day usage as 
well; cf. the data presented in Stikkelorum (1998). I will return to this issue elsewhere. 
7
 In Verhagen (1995) I argue that this phenomenon is in fact closely related to the seman-
tics and the discourse use of the construction as well as the verb. But see Klooster (1986) 
for a discussion within a different framework. 
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(18) a. *… omdat het debat beloofde spannend te worden. [Extraposition] 
  … because the debate promised exciting to become  
(18) b. ...omdat het debat spannend beloofde te worden. [V-raising] 
  … because the debate exciting promised to become  
  ‘… because the debate promised to be exciting’  
(19) a. … toen hij beloofde de grondwet te verdedigen. [Extraposition] 
  … when he promised the constitution to defend  
(19) b. … toen hij de grondwet beloofde te verdedigen. [V-raising] 
  … when he the constitution promised to defend  
  ‘… when he promised to defend the constitution.’  
The present exploration into the history of the verbs involved suggests that 
the use of infinitives with epistemic beloven is a relatively recent development, 
stemming from a time when the semantic development had reached a point that 
an infinitive could come to be used to fill a slot reserved so far for nominal com-
plements. Then it cannot have been the case that the use of the verbs in V- 
raising constructions has developed directly out of that in Extraposition con-
structions, with the semantic change “coming along” with the syntactic change. 
This would in turn require us to radically rethink the relationship between syntax 
and semantics in these constructions, and perhaps more generally. However, 
especially in this area the first thing needed is more detailed empirical research. 
In any case, it seems that the notions of character subjectivity and speaker-
hearer subjectivity—the latter being available for interpretation whenever lan-
guage is being put to use—are very promising ones for understanding certain 
regular patterns of linguistic variation and change, and as guidelines for future 
research. 
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